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Introduction
Jan Cremers and Sigurt Vitols
This book presents the results of a study of workers’ rights in company
takeover situations in Europe. Technically speaking, takeovers represent
an attempt by an external party to acquire or extend a controlling interest
in a company whose voting shares are listed on a public exchange.1 This
external party can be a company, a financial investor, an individual or
other type of entity. Since 2000, more than 11,000 company takeovers
have taken place in the countries currently in the EU/EEA.2
Takeovers are extremely important for workers because a change in
ownership typically leads to restructuring in the firm, which involves
measures such as replacement of leadership, changed working conditions,
increased work intensity and/or mass redundancies. Even when the
workers’ objective working situation does not change, takeovers can cause
considerable stress and loss of motivation and trust in management due
to lack of information and uncertainty about the outcome. When the
acquiring party is another company, such measures frequently affect the
workforce of the acquiring company as well as that of the target. From a
stakeholder point of view, it is therefore crucial that workers have strong
rights to receive timely and full information about the planned takeover
and to intervene at an early stage of the takeover process to protect their
interests. 
In recognition of the impact of takeovers on workers, legislators at both
the national and European levels have defined rights for workers and their
representatives to information, consultation and participation in decision-
making in takeover situations. At the national level, these rights are
typically embedded in a catalogue of rights for worker representation
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1. Note that the word ‘takeover’ is often used in a broader sense to refer also to the acquisition
of a controlling interest in a private company, not just in publicly-traded companies. In this
book we are specifically interested in situations covered by the EU Takeover Bids Directive.
2. This figure is based on our own analysis of Thompson One data. 
bodies. At the European level, the main instrument for defining rights for
workers specifically in takeover situations is the EU Takeover Bids
Directive (2004/25/EC), which was passed over a decade ago. The
European Works Councils Directive (94/45/EC, recast 2009/38/EC) and
the Information and Consultation Directive (2002/14/EC) also define
general rights for workers in restructuring situations, including takeovers. 
This introduction explains the background to and summarises the results
of the study presented in this book. A primary focus of the study is the EU
Takeover Bids Directive (hereafter referred to as the ‘Takeover Bids
Directive’, the ‘Takeover Directive’ or simply ‘the Directive’), which was
the first piece of legislation regulating takeovers at the European level. A
key theme of this study is that the basic rights defined for workers in
takeover situations by this Directive do not allow workers to defend their
interests adequately in such situations. In many European countries,
national legislation and industrial relations institutions provide more
effective protection by involving workers at an early stage and defining
stronger rights for consultation and participation in takeover situations.
The importance of national legislation and practice results in wide
variation across countries in the actual rights that workers have. The
review of the implementation of this Directive in 2012 provided an
opportunity for strengthening worker rights through revision, but the
European Commission and European Parliament declined to take this
opportunity. 
The next section of the introduction summarises the economic and
political context for firm restructuring, of which takeovers are an
important type. The third section discusses two different conceptual
approaches to regulating takeovers, namely the ‘shareholder’ as opposed
to the ‘stakeholder’ approach, and shows that the EU Takeover Bids
Directive clearly falls in the ‘shareholder’ camp. The fourth section of the
introduction discusses the intent of the study and the final section
summarises the chapters in the book. 
Why are takeovers important? The economic and
political context
Although most takeovers go unnoticed by the public at large, some
takeovers have received intensive press coverage. This is particularly the
case where the takeovers are contested (for example, ‘hostile’ takeover
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attempts that are resisted by the management and workforce of the target
company), where prominent firms are involved and where the potential
consequences for workers are large. In the United Kingdom, for instance,
an extended takeover battle for Cadbury in 2009–2010 and the
subsequent closure of a major plant in breach of promises made by the
bidder company caught the public’s eye, ultimately leading to a revision
of UK takeover rules (for an analysis see the chapter by Georgina Tsagas
in this volume). The prolonged takeover fight for the German
telecommunications and engineering firm Mannesmann by the UK firm
Vodafone in 2000 also was headline news for months in Germany, a
country in which hostile takeovers were practically unknown (Höpner and
Jackson 2006). In the United States, waves of hostile takeovers – most
prominently in the 1980s – have led to the portrayal of ‘corporate raiders’
in Hollywood movies such as Wall Street.
Apart from some of the spectacular takeovers that were first and foremost
the work of so-called ‘activist’ speculator groups (and which provoked
sharp reactions: for instance, the leader of the German Social Democratic
Party sparked a debate on financial capitalism in 2005 by referring to
private equity firms as ‘locusts’3) the drivers for takeovers can be manifold
(see the chapter by Andrew Pendleton in this volume). Mergers and
takeovers can be motivated by resource seeking, whether in the form of
natural resources, cheap labour, know-how or capital. The driving force
behind expansion can be a search for new markets; later the strategy may
shift to restructuring and/or closure. Most of the related restructuring
and relocation is cost driven, whether it takes the form of an efficiency
operation, a synergy effort or a rationalisation of the production process.
The example of several large conglomerates shows the strategy of asset
seeking via economies of scale in a broad range of economic sectors
(energy, water, BTP, waste management and so on) and with a range of
activities (production, concessions, operational and facility management,
maintenance and so on), including internal competition. At the same
time, there is a clear divergence on the operational side, with a
concentration at the top of the production chain on the core business,
while operations are outsourced and externalised to dependent services,
supply industries and subcontractors. This process of outsourcing and
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3. The German Social Democratic Party in its programmatic debate in 2005 referred to
‘irresponsible swarms of locusts that measure success in quarterly intervals, suck out the
substance and let companies go bankrupt when they have finished eating’ (SPD 2005: 18).  
dependent subcontracting sometimes becomes an aim in itself (leading
to ‘cost reduction’ by minimising labour costs), even if there are no
objective economic reasons and the restructuring as such does not
necessarily imply layoffs. However, in many sectors of the economy across
the EU large enterprises dominate the scene, on which many SMEs are
dependent. This means that the restructuring of the larger companies
potentially has a much greater effect on employment than is indicated by
direct job losses.
Takeovers have become common events in Europe, with more than
11,000 since 2000. The number of takeovers varies from year to year, with
takeover activity being particularly high during ‘speculative’ phases of the
financial cycle, such as the high-tech bubble in 1998–2000 and the run-
up to the financial crisis in 2005–2007 (see Figure 1). The number of
takeovers also varies widely across countries and is not entirely explained
by country size. Factors such as the number of companies listed on the
stock market and how ‘shareholder-friendly’ the regulatory environment
is also play a role (see Table 1). The United Kingdom, for example, has
more than three times as many takeovers as Italy, which is roughly the
same size in terms of population. 
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Shareholders vs stakeholders and the EU
Takeover Bids Directive 
The engagement and involvement of the different stakeholders within the
company has completely shifted in the past three decades. The intro -
duction of free movement principles in the European Union created an
attractive open market for businesses. Along with the removal of the
internal borders in Europe, the Member States and the European
Commission started to work out an unrivalled deregulation agenda. At
the start there was at least lip service to a corporate governance model
with a well-balanced division of power between the different stakeholders.
Capital owners, management and labour cooperated in a productive
environment and kept the real economy going. But this engagement and
involvement of the different stakeholders within the company has been
eroded in the past three decades.
The globalisation of an important part of the business environment has
brought spectacular takeovers, mergers and demergers, and financial
market liberalisation has created a global field for gain. A key question in
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this development is nowadays where and in whose hands the power centre
lies in a company, as the connection between ownership relations and the
management structure has been loosened. Activities of financial investors
and groups of so-called ‘activist’ shareholders have further separated
ownership from the risks taken. Modern managers who job-hop to the
places with the best bonuses have replaced the classical entrepreneur at
the top of the firm. The board of directors, the supervisory board or
council of commissionaires, site and country management, works
councils, trade unions and shareholders are part of a power struggle for
corporate control that can even lead them into the courtroom. The
interaction inside companies between capital owners, management,
corporate owners, employees and their representatives and other
stakeholders will probably diverge within the different market strategies
developed. The results can be changing coalitions and a great variety of
opportunities and limits for real worker involvement in decision-making
processes.
In terms of company law and financial regulation, the distribution of
rights between the different parties involved in takeovers is a highly
controversial matter in both academic and public policy debates. At one
extreme, the ‘shareholder’ (or alternatively ‘shareholder value’) approach,
which typifies mainstream economic thinking, views takeovers in a
favourable light, seeing them as a major driver of economic ‘efficiency’
(Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jensen 1988). According to this view, which
gives primacy to financial ownership, a so-called ‘open market for
corporate control’ is desirable because it allows a company to be acquired
by a new owner who can do a better job of running the firm and creating
more value. Furthermore, the threat of a hostile takeover is held to be the
ultimate mechanism for disciplining underperforming management, as a
new owner could replace the managers of the acquired company. This
theoretical perspective generally sees the impact of takeovers on workers
as positive, because the new entity is supposed to be a more efficient and
competitive employer. 
The stakeholder approach, however, takes a fairly critical view of
takeovers. It emphasises the short-term orientation of many shareholders,
who typically have the sole right to decide on whether or not to accept a
takeover bid, and the disruption of implicit contracts with stakeholders
such as workers that takeovers often involve (Horn 2012; Johnston 2009;
Sjåfjell 2009). For the stakeholder view, the hostile takeover is a symbol
of unbridled financial capitalism, particularly in the case of highly
Jan Cremers and Sigurt Vitols
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leveraged takeovers when target companies are loaded with so much debt
that regular investments become compromised, ultimately leading to
‘restructuring’ and employment losses. This perspective also sees many
‘friendly’ takeovers as being driven by a financial logic of ‘cashing out’ over
the short to medium term rather than a concern for the long-term survival
of the firm through investment in skills and innovative products and
services. In those terms – as illustrated by many of the case studies in this
book – stakeholders (employees, the region, even local management) may
come into conflict with speculators. 
The question of how takeovers should be regulated is thus a very
controversial and politically divisive issue, because the question is which
party ultimately has the right to decide who the owner of a firm is.
Although proposals for a European takeover directive date back to the
1970s, this issue has been regulated only recently at the European level,
through Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids. Two issues that have
been particularly controversial are the extent to which companies are
allowed to take steps to discourage takeovers (‘takeover defences’) and
workers’ rights in the takeover process. Academic analyses have typically
contrasted an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ approach, which restricts both takeover
defences and the rights of workers, with a ‘continental European’
approach, which allows such defences and grants workers more ‘voice’ in
such situations. After a hung vote in the European Parliament in July
2001 on a proposed Takeover Directive, the European Commission later
that year appointed a High Level Group of Company Law Experts
(frequently referred to as the ‘Winter Group’ after its chair Jaap Winter)
to analyse the issue and come up with a solution to the impasse.
Subsequent to the publication of two reports by the group, the
Commission proposed a new Takeover Directive in 2002, which was
adopted – in modified form – two years later as Directive 2004/25/EC of
21.04.2004. 
The 2004 European Directive on takeover bids (2004/25/EC) in principle
served two main purposes: the Directive had to coordinate the (national)
safeguards that member states require of listed companies traded on their
markets and it had to protect the interests of shareholders in case of
takeover bids or change of control.4 The Directive gave guidance on how
to proceed with takeover bids and established general principles that had
to be complied with. Special attention was paid to minority shareholders.
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4. See Chapter 1 by Clarke in this volume for a more detailed analysis of the Directive. 
The minimum requirements established by the Directive include, for
instance, the designation of a national supervisory authority with
competences to monitor takeover rules and procedures. According to the
Directive, mandatory information to the shareholders of the offeree has
to be listed in an offer document and the content of this document is
prescribed in a long and detailed item list with minimum requirements
(Article 6). The item list includes some basic information on social issues,
including repercussions for and safeguarding of jobs, any material change
in employment conditions and change of production locations. Other
articles regulate such matters as the obligations of the board of the offeree
company, restrictions on the transfer of securities and restrictions on
voting rights once the process has started. The Directive includes optional
arrangements for member states related to the lawful application of
defensive measures and barriers. The worker involvement enshrined in
the Directive is low profile. It is clear that the legislator at that time (and
in this area) did not see the workforce as a crucial stakeholder. Besides,
there is some inconsistency in the text of the Directive, notably where
there is a link with 'insider information' (see below). 
It is worth examining both the recitals and the articles of the text. A
Directive has to be transposed into national law and normally the national
legislator limits implementation to the articles of a Directive. The recitals
have more limited value, but they do serve to explain the spirit of the
envisaged legislation and can give some guidance (for instance, to judges)
in cases of dispute and conflict. In Consideration 13 it is said that
'appropriate information' has to be provided to workers and their represen -
ta tives concerning the terms of a bid, by means of the offer document. The
meaning (and scope) of the term ‘appropriate’ is neither defined nor made
operational in the articles of the Directive. Consideration 23 refers to
disclosure of information (and consultation) according to relevant national
provisions and the relevant EU legislation (like the EWC Directive and the
2002 general framework Directive on information and consultation). It is
explicitly said in this Consideration that national provisions concerning
disclosure before an offer is launched are permitted to the workforce of the
offeror: 'Member States may always apply or introduce national provisions
concerning the disclosure of information to and the consultation of
representatives of the employees of the offeror before an offer is launched'. 
In the recitals it is said that these provisions have to be in line with the
rules of Directive 2003/6/EC on insider dealing and market manipulation.
Given the fact that, in several Member States, it is considered to be unlawful
Jan Cremers and Sigurt Vitols
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to give any information to the workforce before the launch of a bid, it is
interesting to analyse the extent to which the European legislator has
prescribed such a restricted policy. The 2003 Directive on insider dealing
gives plenty of space for (different) national interpretations. It defines
insider information as 'information of a precise nature which has not been
made public' and forbids the acquisition or selling of shares by people
who have access to inside information because of their employment.
Disclosure of information by insiders is forbidden except in situations
where disclosure 'is made in the normal course of the exercise of his
employment, profession or duties'. If disclosure takes place every
informed person is bound by confidentiality. 
One could very well argue here that, in countries that have a national
regulatory frame of industrial relations with strong worker involvement
(whether through board-level representation or work councils enshrined
in legal acts, or both), the interpretation of recital 23, in combination with
the 2003 Directive on insider dealing, justifies the duty to inform worker
representatives at the earliest possible stage. Several national and European
legal acts formulate the obligation for the management of a company to
inform the workforce in a timely manner on issues of major concern. 
The right to act as workers representative can partly be found in other
parts of the acquis. For instance, based on the European Works Council
(EWC) Directive, an EWC has the right to ask for an extraordinary
meeting with the management (both of the offeree and the offeror) based
on ‘exceptional circumstances’. The EWC Directive gives (in the
subsidiary requirements) the EWC consultation rights in case of
substantial changes and so on. Directive 2002/14/EC (the Information
and Consultation Directive) provides arguments for enhanced rights at
an early stage (Article 4.2. a, b and c) and speaks about ‘such time, in such
fashion and with such content as are appropriate to enable, in particular,
employees' representatives to conduct an adequate study and, where
necessary, prepare for consultation’ (Article 4.3.). Directive 2002/14/EC
also settles in fact the non-problem of confidentiality for insider
information provided at an early stage in Article 6.1: 
Member States shall provide that, within the conditions and limits
laid down by national legislation, the employees' representatives,
and any experts who assist them, are not authorised to reveal to
employees or to third parties any information that, in the legitimate
interest of the undertaking or establishment, has expressly been
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provided to them in confidence. This obligation shall continue to
apply, wherever the said representatives or experts are, even after
expiry of their terms of office. However, a Member State may
authorise the employees' representatives and anyone assisting
them to pass on confidential information to employees and to third
parties bound by an obligation of confidentiality.
Finally, it is appropriate to refer to the information and consultation
section in Chapter III of the 2001 Transfer of Undertakings Directive
(2001/23/EC). This Directive guarantees that rights apply during a legal
transfer or a merger. Article 7 of this Directive specifies a list of items that
both the transferor and the transferee have to inform their respective
employees about. Transferor and transferee must give such information
in good time, before a transfer is carried out. Where measures are
envisaged in relation to the employees, workers’ representatives have to
be consulted in good time ‘with a view to reaching an agreement’ (Article
7.2). The information must be provided and consultations take place in
good time before the change in the business (Article 7.3). Although the
Transfer of Undertakings Directive does not apply to a takeover that is
only based on the acquisition of shares (the transfer of securities), the
outcome for the workforce might be the same. Thus, one would expect
some consistency in the EU legislation. 
Notwithstanding the other parts of the acquis and the openings in its
recitals, the ambition is less obvious and manifest in the articles of the
Directive on takeover bids. Article 6 of the Takeover Directive, which
regulates the mandatory information concerning bids and introduces the
offer document, prescribes that the boards of the offeree and the offeror
shall communicate the offer document to the workers once the document
is made public. Article 8 broadens this duty to workers’ representatives
in all countries where the offeree company is permitted to trade securities.
And Article 9 gives the workers’ representatives the right to receive the
board's opinion of the bid. If received 'in good time' a separate opinion
from the workers’ representatives on the effects of the bid shall be
appended to the board's opinion. Finally, a separate Article 14 says that
the Directive shall be without prejudice to existing national and EU rights
on information, consultation and, if provided, codetermination. However,
the sentence formulated in Consideration 23 (namely that it is lawful to
introduce or apply national provisions concerning the disclosure of
information before an offer is launched) does not show up in the
Directive's core articles.
Jan Cremers and Sigurt Vitols
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Assessing the impact of the Directive:
the GOODCORP study
The impact of the Directive on takeovers in Europe has been a matter of
debate. Some Member States already had ‘shareholder’-oriented takeover
regulations in place prior to the passage of the Directive, notably the
United Kingdom. For other Member States, however, the implementation
of the Directive (in many cases a mere ‘copy–paste’ into national
legislation) led to significant changes in or even the first-time estab -
lishment of a takeover regulatory regime.
Both the shareholder value and the stakeholder perspectives have taken
issue with the Directive. For shareholder value advocates, the Directive
did not go far enough to create a so-called ‘open market for corporate
control’ through stronger restrictions on takeover defences (Edwards
2007; Davies et al. 2010). Specifically, the Directive does not require
Member States to implement the so-called ‘board neutrality rule’, which
would require the board of a target company to get permission from
shareholders to take defensive measures once a takeover bid has been
made (Article 9). The Directive also does not oblige Member States to
apply the ‘breakthrough rule’ (Article 11), which requires the application
of the ‘one share–one vote’ principle to shareholder voting on defences
once a bid has been made. Finally, the Directive authorises Member States
to implement a ‘reciprocity rule’, which allows companies to ignore any
‘board neutrality’ and ‘breakthrough’ rules in place if the bidder comes
from a jurisdiction that does not impose these requirements on its own
companies. Thus, according to this viewpoint, the Directive made too
many concessions to the ‘continental’ model to create what they regard
as a truly ‘open’ market for takeovers and thus should be revised to
strengthen shareholder power.
From the stakeholder perspective, however, the passage of the Directive
represents a clear victory for the shareholder paradigm in European
company and securities law (Horn 2012; Johnston 2009; Sjåfjell 2009).
In particular, the decision on whether or not a bid gets accepted is clearly
placed in the hands of the shareholders of the target company, to the
exclusion of workers or the management of the target company. As will
be detailed later on in this introduction and in the rest of this book,
although some provision is made for ‘worker voice’ the rights granted to
workers are fairly weak and in no way challenge the rights of shareholders
to make the decision. In some instances, existing rights and practices in
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labour law and industrial relations, which also come into play in takeover
situations, have been ‘trumped’ by securities and company law, for
example, the requirement of confidentiality. Significantly, shareholder
value advocates have not complained about worker rights being too strong
in the Directive. 
Although the external study on the implementation of the Directive picked
up many of the criticisms and complaints of trade unions in its final report
(Marcuss Partners and CEPR 2012), the European Commission declined
to take up the task of significantly revising the Directive. In its Report to
the European Parliament, Council and other EU bodies, the Commission
argued that the financial crisis starting in 2007/2008 had led to a
significant reduction in the number of takeovers, thus making it difficult
to evaluate the impact of the Directive in practice (European Commission
2012). Although action was needed on a number of points, such as
‘concertation’, the way forward would best be found through further
discussions. The Commission acknowledged the workers’ representatives’
complaints about the Directive and pledged to initiate a dialogue with
trade unions. According to the ETUC this promise has not yet been
honoured – at the time of publication of the present volume – more than
three years after the publication of the Communication (see Séverine
Picard in this volume). It should also be noted that, even though takeover
activity certainly decreased after reaching a peak in 2008 in Europe, in
no way did takeovers disappear, as a minimum of 500 have taken place
every year since then (see Figure 1).
Given the importance of takeovers for workers, the ETUI’s GOODCORP
network of academic and trade union experts on corporate governance
and company law in 2013 decided to conduct its own detailed study of the
issue of worker rights during takeovers. The study had three aims:
— to map workers’ rights in Europe to information, consultation and
codetermination during takeover bids; this varies from country to
country, not only because the EU Takeover Bids Directive was
implemented differently in different countries (in some cases going
above and beyond what was required by the Directive), but also
because regulations on takeover bids may have pre-existed
implementation and industrial relations regulations and practices
may also play a role; 
— to gather evidence regarding the extent to which these rights are in
fact respected and utilised in practice; and
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— to identify which rights are particularly effective for the protection
of workers’ interests during takeovers, as this experience might
inform demands for revision of the Directive. 
In order to carry out this investigation members of the GOODCORP
network were commissioned to conduct a series of case studies of national
regulations on takeover bids and of specific cases of takeovers. Further -
more, a set of studies on cross-cutting issues including the underlying
rationale of the Directive and the economic and employment impact of
takeovers were commissioned. The ongoing work and results of these
efforts were discussed at the regular twice-yearly GOODCORP meetings
over the past couple of years. The reports are now published as the
chapters in this book and the main results summarised in the conclusion.
The remainder of this introduction briefly introduces these chapters. 
The first section of the present volume contains chapters on ‘transversal’
issues that cut across national boundaries. Chapter 1 by Blanaid Clarke
provides a legal analysis of the Directive and the role that employees play
in it. An examination of the background and underlying rationale of the
Directive indicates that legislators recognised that workers’ interests can
be affected by takeovers and made an effort to provide some protection,
namely rights to specific types of information about the projected impact
of the takeover. However, the author concludes that these rights are
completely inadequate to protect workers’ interests; they are limited to
information and do not extend to decision-making on the outcome of the
takeover bid, which are granted to shareholders. 
Hans Schenk, in the next chapter, critically analyses the economic
rationale underlying the Directive, which makes the assumption that
takeovers on the whole have a very positive economic impact. A review of
the relevant statistical studies shows that this assumption does not hold
in reality, as takeovers generally only create short-term wealth for the
shareholders of the target company. Most takeovers take place during the
‘euphoric’ stage of merger waves and are motivated more by the ‘perverse’
motivations of managers than by long-term economic logic, such as pre-
empting being taken over by another firm. The results of these studies call
into question the rationale of the Directive that takeovers should be
encouraged. 
Chapter 3, by Andrew Pendleton, continues in this vein by examining the
evidence on the employment effects of takeovers, which also are supposed
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to be positive, according to the underlying rationale of the Directive.
Econometric studies, however, show a fairly mixed picture, as results
seem to vary based on the methodology used as well as the specific time
period and sample of firms examined. On the whole there is disagreement
on the net employment impact of takeovers; it is clear from these studies,
however, that many, if not most takeovers involve job losses, at least in
the short run. This suggests that workers should receive stronger rights
in order to influence the outcomes of takeovers or discourage potentially
‘bad’ takeovers to better protect their interests during the takeover
process. 
The final chapter in Section 1, by Séverine Picard, outlines the European
Trade Union Confederation’s (ETUC) critical analysis of the Takeover
Bids Directive and the scant attention paid to workers’ rights in company
law. In the review process of the functioning of the Takeover Directive the
ETUC expressed its criticisms, as many takeovers are detrimental to
workers’ interests and workers’ rights in the Directive are weak. The
ETUC thus demands the strengthening of workers’ rights in takeover
situations through a revision of the Directive. 
Section 2 of the book contains twelve chapters on national legal
frameworks regulating takeover bids in each country, in alphabetical
order based on country name. Industrial relations and labour law
frameworks are also summarised insofar as they are relevant for
takeovers. Nine of these chapters also include one or more case studies
of takeovers. In Chapter 5 Helmut Gahleitner argues that the worker
protections provided in the Austrian legal framework on takeover bids
are inadequate because they come too late in the process. Because most
public companies in Austria have a majority owner, controlling owners
frequently strike a deal ‘behind the scenes’ to transfer ownership, before
the public announcement of the bid is made. In this situation the works
council’s right to issue an opinion on the takeover is, for all practical
purposes, rendered irrelevant. The case study he examines – the 2007
takeover of Böhler-Uddeholm – is atypical, as one of the few hostile
takeover situations in Austria. In this type of situation, workers’
representatives were able to form a coalition with others to oppose a bid
by a private equity ‘investor’ and support a ‘white knight’ bid by
Voestalpine, another Austrian company. 
In the following chapter Guy van Gyes analyses the Belgian legal frame -
work, which goes above and beyond what is required by the EU Takeover
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Bids Directive by giving the Belgian works council in the target company
the right to meet with the bidder management. This reinforces the strong
position works councils enjoy in Belgium. However, this right does not
apply in cases where the bidder is not from Belgium. This weakness is
illustrated by the case study, the takeover of the Belgian telecommu -
nications company Telenet by the US company Liberty Global.
In Chapter 7 Laura Horn analyses Denmark, where in most cases a strong
system of social partnership in companies is protected from the pressures
of hostile takeovers through ‘closed’ ownership structures at most listed
Danish firms. An analysis of a ‘deviant’ rare case of an unsolicited offer
– the 2012 takeover of takeover of the Danish company Thrane & Thrane
(T&T) by the British aerospace and defence electronics group Cobham –
shows what can happen when the largest owner does not hold a majority
of shares. This type of situation could become more frequent as dispersed
ownership structures become more common. Employee representatives
on T&T’s board were also advised not to pass on the information they had
about the bid to other employees due to fear of disclosure of ‘inside’
information. 
The next chapter discusses another case where workers’ representatives
on the board did not share their information with other workers’
representatives for more than a year after discussions started between
managements; here Maria Jauhiainen analyses the takeover of the
Finnish steel producer Rautaruukki by the Swedish steel company SSAB
in 2014. This case also shows that the rules regarding confidentiality of
information need to be clarified for and better understood by employee
representatives on boards. Secondly, as European Commission compe -
tition authorities required the companies to divest parts of their
operations before the takeover could go ahead, the case illustrates that
European competition policy requirements on the bidding and/or target
companies can significantly magnify the impact of a takeover on the
workforce. 
Udo Rehfeldt in Chapter 9 analyses the French Florange law, which was
passed in 2014 as a response to the closure of two blast furnaces by the
steel group ArcelorMittal, which was originally formed through a hostile
takeover of European companies by the Indian steelmaker Mittal. The
main goal of the law is to oblige a company that plans to close a plant to
search for a new investor who would maintain operations. But it also
attempts to discourage hostile takeovers by giving double voting rights to
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long-term shareholders and by allowing the board of the target company
to take defensive measures without approval from shareholders. Given
that the French implementation of the EU Takeover Bids Directive also
requires the bidder to meet with the works council of the target company
France is thus a case where takeover legislation is particularly
stakeholder-friendly. 
In Chapter 10 Christos Ioannou looks at Greek takeover legislation and
summarises a case study of a takeover of a Greek bank in the wake of the
financial crisis. Prior to implementation, the EU Takeover Bids Directive
represented a (small) step forward for workers in the sense that they
previously had no formal rights to be informed about takeover bids
and/or to issue an opinion to target shareholders. A case study of the
takeover of the Greek Geniki Bank in 2012 shows that even these minimal
rights were bypassed because the normal takeover procedure was not
followed by the Greek government. However, the trade union involved
was able to successfully use EU labour law to get its most important
demands fulfilled in the takeover process.
The next two chapters illustrate cases where workers were able to build
coalitions with other forces and mobilise against takeover bids perceived
as unfavourable to them. In Chapter 11 Kevin O’Kelly analyses another
country, Ireland, where the implementation of the Takeover Bids
Directive in theory created new, if weak, rights for workers in takeover
situations. The right to express an opinion on the takeover offer, however,
has rarely been used in Ireland. An analysis of three bids by the Irish
discount airline Ryanair for the former Irish flagship carrier Aer Lingus
shows that workers were successfully able to ward off these hostile bids
by forming a coalition with other parties concerned about the impact of
such a takeover on workers and consumers. 
In the following chapter Robbert van het Kaar and Jan Cremers examine
the takeover framework in the Netherlands. The implementation of the
Takeover Bids Directive in that country was also ‘cut and paste’ when it
came to worker rights. However, works councils in the Netherlands enjoy
strong statutory rights, including the right to be consulted by
management at an early stage in restructuring situations, such as
takeovers. This right to early consultation appears to conflict with the
takeover legislation’s requirement for confidentiality and the timing of
information disclosure. By joining forces with other interests, workers
were able to successfully mobilise against an attempt by hedge funds to
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take over and split up the Dutch conglomerate Stork and support a
takeover by a ‘friendlier’ party.
Chapters 13 and 15 provide analyses of the framework of laws and rules
applying to takeovers in two Nordic countries, Norway and Sweden. As
in other countries, there is a strong divide between securities and financial
market law, on one hand, and company and labour law, on the other. In
the Nordic model, rules agreed by the social partners are especially
important for workers’ rights in takeover situations. The chapter on
Norway, authored by Bernard Johann Mulder, highlights the importance
of Basic Agreements concluded between trade unions and employers. The
chapter on Sweden, written by Erik Sjödin, shows that there is a general
obligation in the Codetermination Act for management to consult with
workers before there are significant changes in operations. This includes
an obligation for a bidding company to consult with its own workers
before the bid is launched. This right, however, does not extend to
consultations between the target company’s workers’ representatives and
the bidder. 
In Chapter 14 Janja Hojnik describes the legal framework for takeovers
in Slovenia, where rights defined under the Workers’ Participation Act
are much stronger than the information rights granted under national
Takeover Law. A survey of seven chairs of works councils in Slovenian
companies that have recently been taken over shows that companies for
the most part have been complying with requirements under company
law to provide information to workers. However, most of the survey
participants expressed the feeling that they lacked the necessary means
to significantly influence the outcome of the takeover. As a result, they
had not used the right to express an opinion on the takeover bid to
shareholders. 
Georgina Tsagas in Chapter 16 analyses UK takeover legislation and its
revision after the controversial takeover of the British confectionary and
beverage company Cadbury. The UK takeover framework is frequently
cited as the archetypical model of a ‘shareholder oriented’ system which
has influenced the EU Takeover Bids Directive and been adopted (at least
in part) by many other European countries. The 2010 takeover of Cadbury
by the US based company Kraft, in which promises made in the offer
document to keep a key production site open after the takeover where not
kept, showed the weaknesses of the UK takeover framework, for example,
the lack of penalties for not keeping employment commitments made in
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the offer document. British takeover regulation has been revised in a more
stakeholder-oriented direction, in part due to outcry over the Cadbury
case, but practice will have to show whether these changes have resulted
in a significant strengthening of workers’ rights in takeover situations. 
Overall, the country and company case studies are fairly heterogeneous;
nevertheless a number of common themes emerge. First, the case studies
illustrate the importance of workers’ representatives’ concerns about
employment and working conditions in many takeover situations.
Although the national implementation of the EU Takeover Bids Directive
did represent a ‘step forward’ for workers in jurisdictions where no
specific takeover-related rights existed for workers, nevertheless the most
prevalent of these rights is the right to receive information about the
takeover bid, including anticipated employment impacts. Substantive
rights to influence the outcome of the takeover, if they exist at all, are
embedded in pre-existing industrial relations and labour law regimes,
particularly in the right to consult with management before key decisions
are made. The analysis of national legal frameworks and the case studies
indicate that revision of takeover legislation in the direction of a much
more stakeholder-oriented approach is necessary if workers’ interests are
to be better protected in takeover situations. These common themes and
key conclusions are discussed in greater detail in the concluding chapter
of the book. 
We would like to thank the GOODCORP network of corporate governance
and company law experts for contributing chapters to this book and
improving their content through discussions at network meetings. We are
grateful to the ETUI and the EWPCC (European Workers' Participation
Competence Centre) for funding this project and providing the
administrative support needed to organise the network meetings. 
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